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Abstract 
Against the background of a permanent process of welfare reform, in which a pivotal role is played 
by the socio-political debate on ‘who should get what and why’, this paper addresses the question 
about the social legitimacy of differently targeted welfare schemes. It aims to review what is known 
in the academic literature on the social legitimacy of particular types of programs and schemes that 
are targeted at specific needs and needy groups. The central questions addressed are 1) what factors 
- institutional, cultural or even evolutional - make that some forms and aims of welfare targeting are 
more, or less, supported by the public than others, and 2) how these factors can be interpreted and 
related to each other in a more general framework? The review shows that the field needs to 
develop further, which is why the paper concludes with a discussion of some venues for future 
research on the legitimacy of differently targeted benefits. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 ‘Who should get what and why?’ back on the agenda 
The issue of welfare targeting, concerned with the allocation of resources between categories of 
needs and needy groups, has regained a central position in the social policy debate in many, if not all, 
of the European countries. It was central to the juvenile stage of the European welfare state in the 
first part of the 20th century, and seemed to have been solved more or less definitely in its mature 
state in the prosperous 1960s and 1970s. However, with the economic downturn following the 1979 
oil crisis, a process of the restructuring of Western welfare states set in, while in the East the political 
turnovers of the late 1980s and early 1990s were the starting point for welfare redesign. Since these 
years, welfare reform has been a constant factor in the ‘silver age’ of the European welfare state 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2002). And there is no foreseeable end to it, since the concept of the welfare state 
and its concrete manifestations in specific social policies became substantially challenged again in the 
past two decades. For instance, by intensified international economic competition that threatens the 
redistributive capacity of national welfare states (Korpi and Palme, 2003) and by demographic aging, 
new family arrangements and labour market developments that confront the welfare state with ‘new 
social risks’ associated with post-industrial society (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). The combination of 
challenges results in a precarious political context marked by intensified discussions about the scope 
and generosity of the welfare state, which in essence are debates about welfare targeting. 
More concretely, what we witness in most European welfare states is an intensification of critical 
debates about the necessity and fairness of redistributive, solidaristic relationships that have been 
organised through existing welfare arrangements, or that, with a view on social and economic 
challenges, should be organised anew (Schubert et al., 2009). Debates vary across different social 
issues: the intense pension debate is a manifestation of changing interests and views regarding the 
solidarity between the generations (Kohli, 2005), debates about work-care reconciliation have 
solidarity between the genders at their centre (Knijn and Komter, 2004), an increasing reliance on 
means-tested benefits based on austerity arguments reflects a debate on redistribution from the 
richer to the poorer (Fraser et al., 2011), discussions about job seeking confront unemployment 
beneficiaries with the obligations attached to their rights (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014; 
Houtman, 1997), the inclusion of migrants in the welfare state has developed into an issue (‘welfare 
chauvinism’) of itself (van Oorschot, 2008; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006), and debates about the 
solidarity and related redistribution between peoples of Europe are upcoming (Ferrera, 2003; Mau, 
2005). The OECD, the European commission, the World Bank and the IMF have all contributed to 
these debates by advocating more selective targeting of benefits at needy groups or those in ‘real’ 
need (Marx et al., 2013). Given the austerity policies as a consequence of the recent economic crisis 
a ‘universal decline of universalism’ is even discussed (Béland et al., 2014; Mkandawire, 2015), but it 
also seems that especially means-tested schemes are vulnerable in times of austerity (Nelson 2007). 
Clearly, the welfare state debate seems to have made a full circle, in the sense that the basic welfare 
question of ‘who should get what, and why’, which dominated the debate in the early times of 
welfare state formation, is back to the fore again, and will possibly stay there for some time to come 
(van Oorschot, 2013).  
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This longer-term perspective on the need for welfare reform and the related debates on (re-) 
targeting justify addressing the question about the social legitimacy of differently targeted welfare 
schemes. 
In this paper we aim to review what is known in the academic literature on the social legitimacy of 
particular types of programs and schemes that are targeted at specific needs and needy groups. Our 
questions are 1) what factors - institutional, cultural or even evolutional - make that some forms and 
aims of welfare targeting are more, or less, supported by the public than others, and 2) how these 
factors can be interpreted and related to each other in a more general framework? Our review will 
show that the field needs to develop further, which is why we conclude the paper with a discussion 
of some venues for future research on the legitimacy of differently targeted benefits. 
However, before discussing the state of art as we perceive it we elaborate on our position regarding 
the two central concepts of social legitimacy and targeting. This helps the reader in understanding 
the conceptual perspectives from which we discuss the general issue, and it sheds light on some of 
the practical choices we made to delineate the possibly broad subject.  
1.2 Social legitimacy 
With social legitimacy we refer to the degree to which the general public supports specific benefits, 
which degree is commonly measured with public opinion data (Ringen, 1987). In our perspective, 
social legitimacy cannot be measured in an absolute sense. Empirically based statements are possible 
only about whether in a specific context or time period a benefit X has a higher or lower public 
support (compared to a benefit Y). As we will see later, the literature in the field shows that support 
for benefits and their related legitimacy is never self-evident, but can differ quite strongly between 
types of benefit, target groups of social protection, categories of citizens, countries and regions, and 
over time. 
In our view, policy-makers, interest groups and academics alike are helped with an understanding of 
the general public’s consent with, or rejection of, social benefits. For policy-makers especially, such 
information is of pragmatic essence, since public opinions form a cultural context with a conditioning 
effect on their room for manoeuvre when rationing welfare rights and entitlements (Burstein, 2003; 
Brooks and Manza, 2006; van Oorschot, 2006), either by ex-ante agenda-setting or by ex-post 
legitimation (van Oorschot, 2007). This is not to suggest, however, that public attitudes would always 
have a direct effect upon policy making. The growing literature on this issue learns that there are 
some examples of direct effects of public opinion on social policy making, but mostly effects are 
indirect, through a 'median voter' mechanism, media debates, lobby group activities, etc. (Page and 
Shapiro, 1983; Manza et al., 2002). 
We acknowledge that it is not only the general public that has opinions on the legitimacy of social 
benefits. Relevant other groups like politicians, policy makers, administrators, street-level 
bureaucrats, representatives of interest groups, experts etc. all have their ideas on the issue. Such 
ideas may directly influence actual policy-making and policy implementation, but also indirectly as 
e.g. through their influence on mass-media discussions and target group portrayals (Schneider and 
Jacoby, 2005). However, in this working paper we focus on social legitimacy among the general 
public, for no other reason than that there is very little empirical research on the opinions of 
individuals from the groups mentioned (De Swaan et al., 2000) (for exceptions see: Blomberg and 
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Kroll, 1999; Forma, 1999; George, 1996; Kallio and Kouvo, 2014). At an aggregate group level one 
could study the relative social legitimacy of specific benefits among e.g. political parties, unions and 
lobby-groups (e.g. by deriving such information from their proposals for benefit design/reform), but 
we do not know of such research. 
Finally, our focus here is primarily on the social legitimacy of social benefits that financially substitute 
or add to people’s incomes. This means, firstly, that we do not discuss studies on the social 
legitimacy of social services as e.g. health care, childcare, education and such, since we are not well 
acquainted with what (with the exception of health care) we feel is (still) a small literature. Secondly, 
it means that, while we will refer to studies and ideas on the social legitimacy of welfare systems as a 
whole (e.g. universal vs selective systems) where this is appropriate, our ‘unit of analysis’ remains 
however the individual social benefit since within welfare systems there can be substantial 
differences between the targeting and related social legitimacy of different benefits, which makes 
analyses at a disaggregated level more accurate (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Marx et al., 2013). 
1.3 Targeting  
 When talking about the targeting of social benefits we realise that semantics play a role, and 
conceptual misunderstandings may easily arise. Therefore, some notes on the concept of targeting 
are necessary to explain what we mean by it in this paper. 
In the Scandinavian social policy debate, for instance, targeting tends to be equated with means-
testing as a way of distinguishing between those people who are entitled to a benefit and those who 
are not (e.g. Palme and Wennemo, 1998). A similar view is at the base of Andries’ account of Belgian 
social security developments (Andries, 1996). In the British debate, however, means-testing is often 
seen as the opposite of universalism (Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014) and is then mostly called 
selectivity (Spicker, 1993). Selectivity, however, is a term used by other authors merely to indicate 
that benefits do not cover all, or very broad categories of, citizens (as universal benefits do), but only 
certain categories among them (e.g. Ferge, 1997). 
To bring order in this conceptual mix-up of the related terms of targeting, universalism, selectivity 
and means-testing, we express as our starting point that we see targeting in social policy most 
generally as a term denoting that social policies and resources are directed at a delineated group of 
citizens. In this sense all social security benefits and social services are targeted (Miller and 
Tomaskovic, 1990; Saunders, 1991). Even proposals for full basic income schemes see the benefit as 
targeted at the adult population, excluding dependent children from it. Skocpol (1991) would see this 
as an example of what she calls ‘targeting within universalism’, which is a term also used by other 
authors to point at exclusionary elements within schemes that otherwise have an overall broad 
coverage of citizens ( van Mechelen and Bradshaw, 2013; Marx et al., 2013). 
We then follow the helpful idea of van Lancker et al. (In Press) that a primary form of delineation is 
on the basis of ‘reference groups’, which are groups that are categorized along broadly defined social 
needs or risks. Examples of reference groups from social policy practice are ‘people of 65 or older’, 
‘workers with an impairment/disability’, ‘unemployed people’, ‘families with dependent children’, 
‘sick employees’, ‘households with lack of means’, ‘all adult citizens’, etc.. Any further targeting 
within such reference groups we consider to be a secondary form of targeting, in which additional 
eligibility criteria define more detailed boundaries between those who are, and those are not 
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included in a scheme’s target group. Criteria for secondary targeting are plentiful, and can for 
instance include (combinations of) age, family size, household type, gender, type of work contract, 
work record, payment of contributions, job seek behaviour, etc.; whatever is seen as relevant by 
policy-makers (and regarded measurable in an administrative sense). However, in the literature, the 
target criterion of financial neediness, operationalized by means-testing as an instrument to 
distinguish between eligible and non-eligible groups, is seen as a criterion qualitatively different from 
others. The reason for this is that in practice means-testing and making use of means-tested benefits 
often create specific problems for (potential) claimants, as e.g. a poverty and unemployment trap, 
stigmatization, instability of entitlements, and non-take-up (Garfinkel, 1982; van Oorschot, 2002a), 
which are typically problems that run counter to full social inclusion as one of the central aims of 
social policy. Because of this, some see an inherent contradiction in the social protection quality of 
means-tested schemes: People’s means is mostly used as a secondary targeting criterion to (best) 
help the ‘truly needy’, but whether means-tested benefits are truly helping the needy (best) is often 
questionable (Titmuss, 1970; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014). The fact that in 
the literature the term of ‘means-testing’ is often equated with the term ‘selectivity’ is 
understandable, since a means-test often reduces considerably the segment of a reference group 
that is eligible for the scheme. 
In our perspective on targeting – directing benefits and services at delineated groups of citizens – the 
universality or selectivity of social benefits is a matter of degree, not of essence (see also: Kangas, 
1995). Furthermore, it is a matter that only seems to be relevant at the level of secondary targeting, 
that is, within reference groups. At the level of primary targeting it is difficult to say whether a 
benefit focusing on elderly is more or less selective than one focusing on unemployed people. But at 
the level of secondary targeting, within e.g. the reference group of elderly or the unemployed, we 
can say that social benefits that exclude smaller segments of the primary targeted reference group 
are more universal, while benefits that exclude larger segments of it are more selective. In practice it 
may even be difficult, however, to measure and compare the degrees of universalism or selectivity of 
schemes that focus on the same reference group, among others since secondary target criteria 
applied in the one scheme may be qualitatively different from criteria applied in the other. For 
examples of such measuring see Saunders (1991) on selectivity and Goul Andersen (2012) on 
universalism. 
Note that, following the literature, in this paper we focus on what we would like to call, a ‘target 
group’ perspective on targeting, as distinguished from a ‘social expenditure’ perspective. The first 
dominates the literature on the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits and sees targeting in 
terms of social protection coverage, that is, as defining which categories of citizens within specific 
reference groups are considered eligible for social benefits, and which are not. This is different from 
seeing targeting from a ‘social expenditure’ perspective, which looks at how financial resources are 
differently distributed over social risks and categories. This perspective is applied in studies on the 
outputs and outcomes of welfare provision (see e.g.: van Lancker et al., In Press), but rarely in social 
legitimacy studies. 
2 The social legitimacy of differently targeted social benefits  
Early European poor laws distinguished between those categories of poor people who were seen to 
be deserving of relief - aged, sick and infirm people, children - and those who were regarded as 
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undeserving - unemployed people, idle paupers, those capable of work (Golding and Middleton, 
1982; Waxman, 1983; Katz, 1989; Geremek, 1997). Still, present day welfare states, with their 
protection schemes and services going way beyond the early poor law systems in terms of coverage 
and generosity, treat different groups of needy people differently. For some groups social protection 
is more accessible, more generous, longer lasting, and/or less subjected to reciprocal obligations, 
than for other groups. Just a few examples make this clear: it is usually the case that elderly people 
and disabled people can rely more strongly on less stigmatizing benefits, than, for instance, 
unemployed people; in many countries widows are better protected by national benefit schemes, 
than divorced women; mostly, core workers can rely on more comprehensive social insurance 
schemes, than peripheral workers; and job seek obligations attached to benefit receipt are usually 
more relaxed for older people and single parents. 
Such differential targeting of social rights and obligations may reflect various considerations of 
policy-makers, but what interests us here are questions about its social legitimacy. That is, to what 
degree does the general public consent with and support different social benefits, and the 
differences in welfare provision they entail for different groups of citizens? And what factors make 
that some social benefits are supported more by the general public than others? 
Our literature review learns that there are three research approaches to these questions, situated in 
two main groups. A first group of studies seeks the source of differential support in institutional 
characteristics of benefits (and welfare systems). A second group focuses on differences in 
perceptions of the characteristics of the target groups of benefits. Within this group, one stream of 
research studies effects of general public images of target groups in terms of stereotyping and 
stigma, while another stream investigates differences in social support in relation to the popular 
deservingness of target groups, that is, to public perceptions of how different target groups score on 
a series of specific deservingness criteria. 
As we will explain later in more detail, there are linkages between these three approaches, but we 
will discuss them separately first.  
2.1 Institutional characteristics of social benefits 
Studies examining the legitimacy of targeted benefits taking an institutional approach in explaining 
why some welfare programs generate more solidaristic attitudes than others, seek to understand this 
from differences in the design of benefits, in terms of how benefits are targeted and implemented. 
The underlying idea is that institutional design defines opportunity structures, which has 
consequences for the interest individuals and groups have in a scheme (as contributors and 
claimants), and design may affect the degree of trust people have in the fair operation of benefits.  
Opportunity structures 
As for the role of opportunity structures and related interests, the main premise in many studies 
about welfare support is that people more endorse those benefits they are benefiting from, or are 
likely to benefit from. This generally means that more universally targeted benefits, which by our 
definition exclude smaller segments of reference groups, tend to have a higher social legitimacy 
(Goodin and LeGrand, 1987; Wilson, 1987; Skocpol, 1991; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). In line 
with this argument it is found that usually the middle and higher income classes support more 
universal programs, like old age pensions and health care from which they benefit themselves, more 
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than they do highly selective means-tested programs, like social assistance or housing allowances 
from which do not benefit themselves (Coughlin, 1980; Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Forma and Kangas, 
1997; De Donder and Hindriks, 1998; Rothstein, 2002; Gelbach and Pritchett, 2002; Moene and 
Wallerstein, 2003). That also contributory social insurance programs tend to have higher social 
legitimacy than means-tested tax-financed assistance programs may be understood as well from a 
difference in numbers of (potential) claimants, but it is suggested that this may also be because 
paying contributions is associated more strongly with building up a personal entitlement to benefits, 
than paying general taxes (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Coleman, 1982; Ullrich, 2002a). 
We are careful to note that the commonly lower social legitimacy of narrowly targeted benefits does 
not mean that means-testing as an instrument for targeting in itself is unpopular among the wider 
public1. Perhaps on the contrary, as Kangas (1995) showed for the Finnish public: A majority was in 
favour of ‘tougher means-testing’ in various schemes generally, but typically, higher and middle 
classes preferred more means-testing in more selective programs, while lower classes preferred 
more means-testing in more universal programs (Kangas, 1995; Ervasti and Kangas, 1995). We also 
want to note that, although in opinion surveys it is consistently found that indicators of people’s 
interest in specific programs (indirectly measured by e.g. their actual work status, income level, age 
and such like) do have an expected effect on their support for programs, such effects are usually not 
very strong (Ploug, 1996; van Oorschot, 2002b). This may be because the personal interest people 
perceive to have in a program may extend beyond their present situation (they have benefitted from 
it in the past, they may expect to need it in future), and beyond their own person as well (family 
members, or close friends using the program) (van Oorschot, 2013). 
Trust in government institutions and fellow citizens 
The social legitimacy of a benefit may not only lie in opportunity structures and substantive (group) 
interests in certain social programs, but it may also be determined by trust in government 
institutions that redistribute benefits and in fellow citizens that are part of this redistribution 
process. This is important to recognise, as Rothstein (2001) points out, because a benefit that is in 
the interest of persons, but mistrusted by them in the impartiality and fairness of its practical 
operation, may still not have high support. Rothstein (1998) argues that support for redistribution 
depends on perceiving a just distribution of burdens, meaning that support is undermined if people 
do not perceive that everybody contributes a fair share, and it depends on the believe that there is 
procedural justice, meaning that the benefit is implemented in a fair and effective manner (i.e. 
cheap, easy, without cheating). In the case of more selective, and especially means-tested benefits, 
both aspects are more problematic. 
The first aspect implies that relative support for a scheme may depend upon people's perceptions of 
the fiscal burden of the scheme, which is related to perceptions of the scheme's generosity and its 
numbers of claimants, compared to that of other schemes. People are conditional co-operators: they 
will pay their fair share only if they believe others will pay their share as well (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2005; Gintis et al., 2005; Kahan, 2005; Rothstein, 1998). As more selective benefits often rely more 
strongly upon the contributions of middle and higher-class groups, while they distribute more to 
                                                            
1 Marx et al. (2013) argue that for that reason nowadays policymakers apply the instrument of means-testing 
to a larger segment of the target population, including not only the poor and unemployed but also 
working families with low incomes. Examples are the Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSA) in France which 
makes work for people on social assistance more lucrative and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 
US, a tax exemption from employees’ social security benefits for working households. 
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lower class groups, the unequal division of burdens could be seen as unfair and detract from the 
scheme’s support (Hills, 2002; Kuklinski and Quirk, 1997).  
 
As for the second aspect, selective benefits do also not excel in procedural justice, because they are 
typically more complex. More monitoring and screening leads to higher administrative costs and 
more bureaucracy (Mkandawire, 2005; Lindert, 2004; van Oorschot, 2002a), which is an important 
aspect of welfare state critique (Roosma et al., 2013; Ervasti, 2012; Rothstein, 1998). Screening also 
sets up higher barriers, leading to non-take up of benefits ( van Oorschot, 2001) and public 
disapproval of this underuse of benefits (Roosma et al., 2014; Ervasti, 2012). Finally, in applying 
discriminating criteria for the eligible and non-eligible people in the wider reference group, highly 
selective schemes tend to give more opportunity for (perceived) abuse (Alston and Dean, 1972; 
Overbye, 1999; Ullrich, 2002a; Roosma et al. 2014), since such benefits entail more rules that can be 
broken. Rothstein (2001) suggests that mass media commonly pay more attention to potential fraud 
of highly selective benefits, which may give rise to a general distrust in the fair operation of these 
schemes. 
Universal and selective welfare regimes 
While we explained to focus our paper on the social legitimacy of benefits, especially in the 
institutionalist approach to understanding differences in welfare legitimacy there is attention paid to 
the social legitimacy of entire welfare systems, more precisely of ‘universal’ versus ‘selective’ welfare 
states. Although in this literature it is often not specified what is exactly meant by these terms, 
suggestions are mostly that more universal are considered to be the social-democratic and, to a 
lesser extent, the corporatist welfare states of respectively Nordic and Continental Europe where 
social benefits are more organised by way of non-means-tested social provisions and contributory 
social insurances, while as selective are seen the Liberal welfare states of the Anglo-Saxon world 
where means-testing is a much more common part of social protection policies. It is generally argued 
in the literature that more universal welfare states (and perhaps also insurance system based welfare 
states (Ullrich, 2002b; Coleman, 1982)) can rely on broader and stronger social and political support, 
than welfare states that are characterized by a selectivistic (means-tested) approach (Rothstein, 
1998; Rothstein, 2001; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Goodin and LeGrand, 1987; Korpi, 1980; Skocpol, 
1991). Selective welfare states create a strong demarcation line between those who contribute (the 
rich and the middle class) and those who benefit (the poor), and are seen as socially divisive, rather 
than as integrative (Rothstein, 1998).2 This gap between contributors and recipients is believed to 
undermine support for the welfare state among the middle and higher classed (Kangas, 1995; 
Rothstein, 1998). Therefore, highly selective welfare systems as a whole, which rely to a large degree 
on means-tested benefits and services, seem to be subjected to what could be called the ‘selectivity 
trap’. That is, once such a system is established, as in the USA, it might prove to be very difficult to 
extend welfare coverage beyond the group of the poorest citizens. In other words, to the extent that 
the public at large sees welfare exclusively as something for the poor only, it will be problematic to 
achieve sufficient levels of social legitimacy and for welfare advocates to motivate the middle masses 
                                                            
2 This socially divisive character also explains why “programs for the poor become poor programs” (Titmuss, 
1970; Rainwater, 1982). That is, their lesser societal legitimacy makes them more vulnerable to a less 
benign and more reserved treatment by policy makers and administrators, leading in practice to lesser 
quality of services and benefits, and of their delivery. 
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for welfare extension (Hills, 2015; van Oorschot, 2013; Korpi and Palme, 1998). In the case of more 
universal welfare states, social legitimacy is easier achieved since more people have a stake in the 
benefits provided, and in case of contributory social insurances it is easier to perceive social 
protection as earned because contributions have been paid. As a result, more universal welfare 
systems are less divisive because they are able to form class alliances between the poor and the 
middle class and generate the political support for a generous welfare state (Korpi,1980). However, 
according to Rothstein, shared interests is not the whole story, since, as we have seen, contributions 
and support also depend on whether people have trust in the just and fair operation of the welfare 
system (Rothstein, 2001). With others, he stresses that there is less opportunity for fraudulent 
benefit recipiency in more universal systems. 
2.2 Public images of target groups 
Stereotypical images of benefit target groups have an important role in studies about the legitimacy 
of social benefits. A general finding is that programs, that are targeted at groups with a (more) 
negative public image, are less supported by the public. These stereotypical images are of various 
kinds and socio-psychological research shows that they can be strong and hard to change (Fiske et 
al., 1999; Allport, 1954; Billig, 1985). Traditionally, in the literature, most attention has been paid to 
negative images the public has of the poor (and especially the ‘black’ poor in the US) and the 
unemployed, but more recently there is a growing focus on negative images of migrants as benefits 
recipients as well. 
The undeserving poor 
As for the poor, in many industrialized societies poverty is a discrediting attribute, and often the poor 
are stigmatized (Titmuss, 1970; Waxman, 1983), where the term stigma refers to ‘an attribute that is 
deeply discrediting’ (Goffman, 1974, p 3). Stigmatisation of individuals and groups is part of a socio-
cultural process of ‘othering’ (Lister, 2014) in which they are withheld social respect and a negative 
social identity is attached to them. Stigmatization implies ‘discrimination, through which we 
effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his [the stigmatised person’s] life chances’ (Goffman, 1974, p 
5). Selective benefits, and especially, means-tested benefits, are highly intertwined with the problem 
of stigmatisation. Means-testing itself often contains several discrediting elements, adding to the 
stigma of poverty as such. Claiming a means-tested benefit makes it evident that a person is not able 
to provide sufficient economic welfare on his or her own, which runs counter to the (increasingly) 
valued ethic of self-responsibility. Claiming a means-tested benefit is thus likely to be seen as 
deviance from prevailing norms, which in turn can be a basis for stigmatisation. Also, as suggested by 
Rothstein (2001), means-tested benefits are often associated with fraudulent behaviour. In addition, 
the discretion exerted by administrators in assessing eligibility to means-tested benefits may reduce 
the extent to which they are perceived as being given 'as of right'. Not seeing a benefit as given as of 
right, but as a form of charity, is believed to invoke feelings of shame and inferiority (Simmel, 1908).3 
                                                            
3 As Simmel already noted in 1908, “...die Gedrückheit, die Beschämung, die Deklassierung durch das Almosen 
hebt sich für ihn [der Arme] in dem Maße auf, in dem es ihm nicht aus Barmherzigkeit, Pflichtgefühl oder 
Zweckmäßigkeit gewärht wird, sondern er es fordern darf.” (Simmel, 1908, p 4562). [...the humiliation, 
shame and loss of status [‘declassement’] brought about by the acceptance of charity are alleviated for 
him [the poor man] to the extent that it [the benefit] is not granted out of compassion or a sense of duty 
or even expediency but rather because he has a valid claim to it.’] 
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More broadly, in addition to their dealing with public agencies, people in poverty are repeatedly 
exposed to shaming by the attitudes and behaviour of the people they meet, and by the tenor of 
public debate that either dismisses them or labels them as lazy and in their dealings with public 
agencies (Walker, 2014). 
 
The black welfare queen 
In the USA various empirical studies have provided evidence that normative images of categories of 
poor people play an important role in the support for welfare. Quadagno (1994) even argues that the 
American welfare state is designed to exclude racial minorities and that racism is embedded in the 
welfare programs. In his influential work Gilens (1999) convincingly shows that indeed there is a 
strong racial element in 'why Americans hate welfare': Americans tend to think that black people are 
more lazy and less responsible than white people, and that therefore welfare is taken up mostly by 
black people (see also: Feagin, 1975; Nelson, 1999). Racial contexts trigger opposition against 
welfare: in areas with large proportions of African-Americans, prejudice and opposition against 
welfare is stronger (Luttmer, 2001; Fullerton and Dixon, 2009). Neubeck and Cazenave (2001) argue 
that it is racism which ties together stigmatized welfare policies and racial stereotypes of the poor. 
They find that public discourses are full of stereotypes of welfare claimants that often have racist 
underpinnings. It is not a surprise, then, that there is very low support for the highly selective 
American welfare scheme ‘temporary assistance to needy families’ (TANF). An additional element in 
these discourse is gender (Monnat, 2008), since TANF is perceived to be mainly used by teen and 
single mothers ('welfare queens') who are morally looked down upon in American society generally, 
and who are assumed to be lazy, unreliable, and/or addicted to drugs and alcohol (Gordon, 2001; 
Rein, 2001). It was argued that the 1996 welfare reform in the US legitimized large cuts by actually 
creating stereotypes of black single mothers in the social debates leading up to the reform (Schram 
et al., 2009). The reform introduced strong sanctions to control the “alleged sexual immorality and 
supposed preference for welfare over work of one group: African-American females” (Neubeck and 
Cazenave, 2001: 4). In practice this racial stereotyping is reflected in sanction policies: black and 
Latina women are at greater risk of being sanctioned (Monnat, 2010) and in local areas in which the 
non-white population increases sanction rates increase (Keiser et al., 2004). But also after these 
reforms, American welfare attitudes remained racialized (Dyck and Hussey, 2008). In stark contrast 
with this stands the common finding that in the US programs in which the targeted groups do not 
suffer from stereotyping, like widows, elderly people, and physically disabled, are supported well by 
the American public (Williamson, 1974; Katz, 1989; Appelbaum, 2001; Huddy et al., 2001).  
The lazy unemployed 
Where racial stereotyping is a central element in American public images of social policy target 
groups (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), European studies on the social legitimacy of benefits have 
traditionally concentrated on public images of unemployed people instead.4 What is consistently 
found is that images tend to be negative. There is rather widespread doubt about unemployed 
people's willingness to work and about proper use of benefits (Furnham, 1982; Golding and 
Middleton, 1982; Albrekt Larsen, 2002; Roosma et al., 2014), even in a universalistic welfare state as 
Sweden (Furaker and Blomsterberg, 2003). And when people are asked to compare unemployed 
                                                            
4 Which may reflect the different outcomes of the American versus the European social model: the first 
generates more poverty, the second more unemployment. 
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people to disabled people (Maassen and De Goede, 1989), or to employed people (Ester and Dekker, 
1986), the unemployed (especially the younger unemployed (see for instance: Albrekt Larsen, 2008)) 
are more seen as having less character, less self-responsibility, less perseverance, and they are seen 
as less trustworthy. Among those who have more negative images of unemployed people support for 
unemployment benefits is usually lower (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014; Lødemel and Trickey, 
2001). 
Immigrants 
In recent years in Europe, however, images that people have of migrants in their society, and how 
such images affect support for benefits, have entered research agenda’s. This discussion originates 
from the puzzle how to combine inclusive welfare policies with equal access for divers groups, which 
is known as ‘The New Liberal Dilemma’ or ‘The Progressive Dilemma’ (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 
2012; Goodhart, 2004; Newton, 2007; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). Following the American 
experience that it is difficult to build up an inclusive and comprehensive welfare system in a context 
of strong racial and ethnical diversity (Alesian and Gleaser, 2004), the suggestion is that in more 
heterogeneous societies support for redistribution is lower, and more specifically, that immigration 
undermines solidarity and the legitimacy of the welfare state (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Brady and 
Finnigan, 2013; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Although in the European case the negative effect of 
increasing diversity on (support for) welfare redistribution is contested (van Oorschot, 2008; Taylor-
Gooby, 2005), in many European societies there is indeed a rather high level of what is called 
‘welfare chauvinism’: support for a strong welfare state for ‘us’ (natives), but less support for welfare 
for ‘them’ (migrants) (Wright and Reeskens, 2013; van der Waal et al., 2010; Reeskens and van 
Oorschot, 2012). In a strict interpretation of the term, welfare chauvinism means that immigrants 
should be excluded from welfare provisions (Koning, 2011), while in less strict interpretations 
immigrants are perceived as less eligible for benefits (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; van der 
Waal et al., 2010). In a recent Dutch survey vignette experiment Reeskens and van der Meer (2014) 
show that the difference between the preferred level of unemployment benefits for immigrants and 
for natives remains the same for varying scores on other attributes of the unemployed like work 
ethos or need: that is, people want lower unemployment benefits for immigrants despite their other 
favourable or unfavourable attributes (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014). This suggests that 
stereotypes of immigrants may be hard to change and that immigrants in European societies may be 
seen as ‘the new undeserving poor’ (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). An important note on this is that in 
a recent vignette study using both UK and Dutch data, Kootstra (2014) also found higher support for 
benefits targeted at natives instead of immigrants. Yet, when in the vignette the note was included 
that ‘immigrants’ were having a job and paid their fare in taxes, the effect diminished. 
2.3 Deservingness perceptions 
An increasing stream of literature addresses differences in the deservingness of target groups as a 
source of differences in the social legitimacy of benefits. Compared to the ‘public images’ literature, 
which is concerned with stigmatised and stereotyped social identities that overshadow other 
characteristics of target groups, the deservingness approach is more detailed, in that it distinguishes 
a series of characteristics of target group (members) (and not just ‘identity’) that may influence the 
social legitimacy of a benefit. The general claim is that people support more those benefit schemes 
that target at groups that are seen as more deserving. Coughlin’s (1980) international review of 
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public opinion studies on welfare support in modern, Western welfare states in the 1960s and 1970s, 
plays a seminal role in deservingness studies, since it was the first to show that other target groups 
characteristics than identity seemed to produce differences in support for benefits. His review 
showed that generally the public was most in favour of social protection targeted at old people, 
closely followed by protection for the sick and disabled, while the support of schemes for needy 
families with children was less, for schemes for unemployed people even more less, and support was 
usually least for social assistance schemes for the poor. Later studies corroborate Coughlin’s 
'universal dimension of support', whether they regard cross-sectional data from different European 
countries (Pettersen, 1995; Ullrich, 2000; van Oorschot, 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; van 
Oorschot, 2006), or (time-series) data from single countries, as for instance, the UK (Taylor-Gooby, 
1985; Hills, 2002), Finland and Denmark (Forma, 1997; Albrekt Larsen, 2002), The Netherlands (van 
Oorschot, 1998), Belgium (Debusscher and Elchardus, 2003) and the Czech Republic (Rabusic and 
Sirovatka, 1999). As mentioned before, in recent studies support for social protection of immigrants 
is also analysed, and found to be at the bottom end of the support dimension (van Oorschot, 2006; 
Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014). 
Five deservingness criteria 
Apparently, support for social benefits targeted at different groups depend on other factors than 
strong stigma and stereotypes as well. There were several clues for these in the literature, suggesting 
that people have perceptions of the general welfare deservingness of target groups which are 
formed by their ideas about how groups ‘score’ on a series of deservingness criteria. van Oorschot 
(2000) developed a framework of five central deservingness criteria based on the findings of several 
studies on the issue (Cook and Barrett, 1992; Cook, 1979; De Swaan, 1988). A first criterion is control 
over neediness, that is, people who are seen as being personally responsible for their neediness are 
seen as less deserving (if at all). This criterion is argued to be specifically important in determining 
deservingness and is in the literature also known as ‘disability’ (De Swaan, 1988) or ‘locus of 
responsibility’ (Cook, 1979). In more recent studies the application of the control criterion on the 
deservingness of target groups is linked towards the degree of job opportunities in a country (Albrekt 
Larsen, 2006); in times of unemployment people claiming benefits are less to blame for their 
situation (Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Hills, 2002; Jeene, et al. 2014; Bryson 1997). A second criterion is 
the level of need, that is, people with greater need are seen as more deserving. This criterion can also 
be extended to dependent children in need (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; Jeene and van 
Oorschot, 2015) which are seen as the ‘innocent third party’ involved (Houtman, 1994). Third, there 
is identity: needy people who are closer to 'us' are seen as more deserving. This criterion can be 
applied to different scales and areas, by kinship relations, place of residence or to identity groups (De 
Swaan, 1988). In more recent studies this deservingness criteria is specifically linked to ethnicity or 
immigrants (van Oorschot, 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; 
Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; van Oorschot, 2008). A fourth criterion is attitude: more deserving 
are those needy people who are likeable, compliant and conforming to our standards. Cook (1979) 
refers to ‘gratefulness’ and ‘pleasantness’, where De Swaan (1988) refers to ‘docility’. And finally, van 
Oorschot (2000) distinguishes the criterion of reciprocity: more deserving are those needy people 
who have contributed to our group before (who have 'earned' our support), or who may be expected 
to be able to contribute in future. Reciprocity is seen as one of the essential features of the ‘moral 
economy’ of welfare states (Mau, 2003) or even the foundations of cooperation in general (Gintis et 
al., 2005). In modern context reciprocity can also be interpreted as the willingness to ‘do something 
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in return’ for a benefit or actively looking for a job or participate in training programs or experience 
jobs. Marx et al. (2013) argue that the American welfare program Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
enjoys greater overall legitimacy because it is perceived to encourage and reward work. Recent 
studies apply the deservingness theory more generally towards (work) obligations attached to 
benefits for different target groups. See our suggestions for further research. 
Assuming that people apply the five criteria to form deservingness opinions, the universal dimension 
of support can be understood as an outcome of such deservingness thinking. For example, migrants 
can be expected to score particularly badly on the criteria of identity and reciprocity, while in the 
public’s eye most migrants may also be accused of having put themselves in a situation of welfare 
dependency. Although the public usually has some doubts about whether unemployed people are 
themselves to blame for their unemployment or not, unemployed people as a group will score better 
on the criteria of identity and reciprocity (the latter especially in countries with contributory 
unemployment insurance schemes). Compared with unemployed people, sick and disabled people 
will usually be seen as more deserving, because in their case there will be much less doubt about the 
involuntariness of their neediness. The most deserving group, however, will usually be the elderly. 
They cannot be blamed for their age, they are close to ‘us’ (they are our parents and grandparents, 
we ourselves hope to live to an old age), they have extra age-related needs, they have earned their 
share in their productive life stage, and they are not seen as an ungrateful and demanding group. 
These five deservingness criteria seem to predict a universal rank order in the deservingness of 
needy groups, which is comparable across European welfare states (van Oorschot, 2006). Yet, there 
are differences within the relative deservingness of target groups across countries. Taking into 
account the effects of cultural bias in expressing support for deserving groups, Meier Jaeger (2007) 
shows that support for the old and the sick is universal high, while support for the poor and the 
unemployed is not only lower but also more differentiated across countries.  
A gradual deservingness dimension 
It should be stressed that deservingness is a relative concept, that is, the difference between 
deserving or undeserving is gradual, with most target groups falling somewhere in between both 
extremes. Kolemen (2010) emphasizes in this respect that if a group is regarded as ‘not clearly 
deserving’ this does not mean that it is ‘clearly undeserving’, and vice versa. Groups take in different 
positions on the dimension because perceptions of their deservingness may be formed on the basis 
of a different selection of criteria, that is, not each criterion may be seen as equally important for 
each group. An example of this is when migrant status dominates a group’s popular deservingness 
ruling out the possible influences of other characteristics, which was found in the vignette study of 
Reeskens and van der Meer (2014). While in case of non-migrant status other characteristics, as for 
instance control or reciprocity, may come to play a decisive role. A second reason for the gradualness 
of deservingness perceptions lies in the fact that target groups may combine different relevant group 
characteristics. For instance, as was found in a Dutch study, while elderly as a generic group have 
high deservingness generally, this may be less so for rich elderly (who score lower on the criterion of 
‘need’), or while unemployed tend to have a lesser deservingness, this may be higher for disabled 
unemployed (who score higher on the criterion of ‘control’) (van Oorschot, 1998). Nevertheless, the 
literature, as we discussed it above, suggests that in present day US and Europe the generic groups of 
‘black people’, respectively ‘migrants’ are close to the undeserving extreme, while ‘elderly people’ 
are close to the deserving extreme. 
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The relative weight of deservingness criteria 
An issue addressed in the literature is whether all deservingness criteria have the same weight, or 
whether some are usually more important in forming deservingness perceptions, than others. 
Several scholars have made suggestions that point in different directions. For instance, De Swaan 
(1988) regards 'disability', or lack of control, most important, acting even as a necessary condition for 
deservingness. This would imply that once the public feels that a person can be blamed for his or her 
neediness fully, other criteria become irrelevant. A fact is that in many empirical deservingness 
studies perceived personal responsibility or control stands out as an important determinant of 
people's perceptions of the deservingness of the poor (e.g. Cook and Barrett, 1992; Cook, 1979; van 
Oorschot, 2000). However, the literature on the poor deservingness of migrants in European 
societies and the racial stereotype based undeservingness of the US poor suggests that the identity 
of the targeted group is quite relevant as well. Being seen as ‘one of them’ rather than ‘one of us’, 
seems to draw a strong demarcation line in deservingness of benefits (De Swaan, 1988; Reeskens and 
van der Meer, 2014; Kootstra, 2014). Finally, there are studies that argue that reciprocity is at the 
heart of deservingness perceptions, since reciprocity forms the foundation for solidaristic 
cooperation (Mau, 2003; Gintis et al., 2005). Rather than appointing one of the deservingness criteria 
as ‘the most important’ it is more likely that the weights of criteria differ in different contexts. 
The following model sketches our conception of how a target group’s overall deservingness is a joint 
result of the positive or negative scores of the group on the five deservingness criteria. 
 
Figure 1. A model of the deservingness of a target group  
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The figure 1 suggests that the relative deservingness of a specific target group positions itself on a 
dimension ranging from ‘very undeserving’ to ‘very deserving’, and results from a combination of 
scores of the target group on the five separate criteria. These scores Ta may be more or less 
positive/negative and can have a different weight (effect) in the overall deservingness outcome. It is 
important to realise that the Ta scores and weights, and therefore the overall outcome, can be 
different across individuals, and that the deservingness of target group A in the general public’s eye 
is an aggregate of such individual perceptions. Important as well is that at individual and aggregate 
level Ta scores, weights and overall outcomes can change over time, as a result of changes at 
individual level (e.g. when a person gets older his or her perception of the blamefulness of 
unemployment may change), and at context level (e.g. citizen’s may perceive unemployment as less 
blameful in times of high unemployment). 
3 A heuristic model for understanding the social legitimacy of differently 
targeted benefits  
3.1 Three approaches to legitimacy  
We have seen that there are three approaches in the existing literature on the social legitimacy of 
differently targeted benefits. The ‘institutional’ approach seeks to understand such differences from 
differences in institutional design of benefits (and by extension: of welfare systems). It is suggested 
that design characteristics create specific incentive structures and have consequences for the trust 
people (can) put in the just and fair operation of a benefit. Related to these factors, in the 
institutional approach more selective benefits are assumed to have lower legitimacy than more 
universal benefits, while it is especially means-tested benefits that generally score lowest. In the 
‘public images’ approach differences in legitimacy are seen as being related to general images the 
public has about the target group of schemes. Typical for this approach is that it focuses on groups to 
which strongly negative images exist, which are stigmatised and stereotyped, leading to (very) low 
legitimacy for benefits that address their needs. In the ‘deservingness’ approach differences in 
legitimacy are related to people’s perceptions of the deservingness of target groups, which can take 
in a position in between positive (deserving) or negative (undeserving). As in the public images 
approach, in this approach the social identity of target groups plays a role, but in addition to that it 
recognizes a series of criteria that people may apply when forming their deservingness opinions 
(need, control, attitude, reciprocity, and identity). The essence of this approach is the idea that 
people judge the deservingness of a target group against a number of criteria, and that the benefit 
that addresses this group is more legitimate to the degree that the overall judgment turns out 
positive. 
In many cases of differences in the social legitimacy of benefits it may be difficult (if at all possible) to 
assess which of the three approaches will be ‘best’ in understanding them. This is because often 
there are many more variables involved (like aspects of scheme coverage, generosity, claimant 
numbers, institutional character, target group images, perceptions of deservingness etc.), than there 
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are benefit cases to compare (Gilens, 1999). But a central issue seems to be as well that the factors 
that are seen as important from each approach may be interrelated.  
3.2 Interrelations 
That such interrelations exist between public images and deservingness perceptions seems self-
evident. A strongly negative image will almost by definition lead to a negative score on the criterion 
of identity, while the reasons for a negative image may be a negative score on an important 
deservingness criterion. For example, American blacks are a negatively stigmatized group, and are 
therefore seen as less deserving, but the stigma centres on the perception that they particularly 
score low on the criterion of ‘responsibility’ or ‘control’, that is, that they are lazier than whites 
(Gilens, 1999) and can therefore be blamed for their neediness. While in Europe the relatively 
negative image of unemployed people is also connected to the criterion of ‘control’, that is, to 
doubts about whether they cannot be blamed for being unemployed (e.g. Furnham, 1982; Halvorsen, 
2002). 
Interrelations may as well exist between institutional factors and deservingness perceptions (Albrekt 
Larsen, 2006). This can be illustrated by two extreme examples of a strongly selective benefit, a 
means-tested benefit directed at the poor only, and a strongly universal scheme, an unconditional 
universal basic income for all citizens. As we have seen, means-tested benefit schemes directed at 
the poor tend to have a low legitimacy. From the institutional dimension this is understandable since 
in such schemes there is usually a strong demarcation between the group of contributors (the non-
poor), who themselves have a low chance of ever profiting from the scheme, and the recipients (the 
poor), which may lead to perceptions of an unjust division of burdens. The relative expensive 
administration of means-tested schemes may add to the high cost perception among the non-poor. 
The complexity of means-testing offers more opportunities for fraud and fraud perception, which 
from the deservingness perspective enforces negative perceptions of benefit claimants since fraud 
and misuse can be seen as an unwillingness to take responsibility for one’s own life (criterion of 
‘control’) and/or as a manifestation of a despised moral (criterion of ‘attitude’). The general 
undeservingness of the target group of a means-tested benefit may trigger policy makers to make 
the scheme even more selective and to implement stricter criteria to demarcate more ‘fairly’ the 
deserving from the undeserving poor. In turn, this institutional adaptation may generate more 
bureaucracy, higher perceived abuse, and decrease the legitimacy of the benefit scheme even 
further. Thus, a stronger focus on discriminating deserving from undeserving target groups may lead 
to an institutional ‘selectivity’ reflex, which makes the scheme less legitimate instead of more 
legitimate. This is a paradox of means-tested benefits.5 In case of universal benefits, which usually 
have a high social legitimacy, there may be an interplay between institutional and deservingness 
factors as well. Take the example of a most universal benefit scheme, an unconditional basic income 
                                                            
5 Which paradox underlies the often recognized observation that ‘programs for the poor tend to be poor 
programs”, as quoted above, but it also underlies the so-called ‘paradox of re-distribution’, which points 
to the observation that the degree of poverty relief tend to be lower in welfare systems that are designed 
from a selective perspective, compared to those that are designed from a more universal approach (Korpi 
and Palme, 1998). This paradox has been the subject of several empirical studies, with sometimes 
contradicting conclusions about its existence. However, a most recent study with better, time-series data 
corroborated it (McKnight, 2015). This suggests that focusing welfare protection on the poor only is 
generally not in the best interest of the poor (van Oorschot, 2013).  
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for all citizens. From the institutional perspective on legitimacy such a scheme has many favourable 
characteristics: bureaucratic costs are low, everyone is included so there is no demarcation between 
contributors and recipients, and fraud or abuse is not possible. Survey studies in the Netherlands 
(TNS-NIPO, 2014; van Oorschot, 1998), however, indicate that only minorities of about 20%-30% are 
in favour (with most of them arguing that it would mean the end of benefit fraud), while majorities of 
about 50% are against. The most important reasons given by them refer to deservingness criteria, 
that is: they feel that many people might not need the basic income (criterion of ‘need’), that it is not 
fair that those who do not want to work would get an unconditional benefit (criterion of 
‘reciprocity’), and that the incentive to do paid work and care for one’s own may be lost (criterion of 
‘control’) (van Oorschot, 1998). So, determining the separate influence of factors from the 
institutional perspective and from the deservingness perspective may be rather complex, that is, the 
social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits might be the result of interplay between the two. 
In Figure 2 we summarise the main factors that may influence the social legitimacy of a benefit X that 
is targeted at a group A, as well as their interrelationships. The model suggests that in case one 
would be interested in the relative social legitimacy of a specific benefit scheme, one would need to 
have information about the incentive structures and trust relationships created by its institutional 
design, about whether there are rather strong positive or negative public images of its target group, 
and how the general public feels that the target groups scores on a series of deservingness criteria. 
 
Figure 2. A heuristic model for understanding the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits 
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3.3 A pivotal role for deservingness perceptions? 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that there are three types of approaches to understanding 
differences in the social legitimacy of benefits, and that factors from each may be interrelated, there 
are arguments why deservingness perceptions could be seen as pivotal in producing differences in 
legitimacy. 
Firstly, institutional characteristics (and their related legitimacy) of present-day schemes may be 
affected by deservingness opinions during the schemes’ formative years. Where it is generally 
accepted that target group images and underlying deservingness opinions play a role in the 
formation of present-day policies (e.g. Burstein, 2003; Brooks and Manza; Rein, 2001), it seems 
justified to assume that they have played a role in the past as well. There are no studies that have 
explicitly looked into this, but it is hinted upon in the literature in several ways. An interesting finding 
from a study by Kangas (2000) on the historical beginnings of various social security benefits in 
European welfare states is the particular chronology of their introduction: from the end of the 19th 
century onwards first the schemes for the commonly most deserving categories of old, sick and 
disabled people were introduced, than family benefits and unemployment compensation, and lastly 
(if at all) social assistance for the least deserving category of poor people. Another hint comes from a 
study by Kahl (2005) on the religious roots of social assistance schemes in European countries, in 
which she suggests that social assistance arrangements in the Catholic European countries differs 
from those in Calvinistic countries based on different perceptions of the poor: in the Catholic 
perspective the poor are more seen in a traditional Christian way as a pitiful and deserving group of 
‘children of God’, while in the Calvinistic perspective poverty is associated with the laziness and 
immorality of an irresponsible and therefore undeserving ‘underclass’. These arguments suggest that 
perceptions of deservingness of target groups (and related stigma’s) were underlying the choices in 
the previous development of benefit schemes. 
A second argument why deservingness perceptions may be pivotal is based on empirical findings that 
in all European countries, and among all social categories, the rank order of deservingness of the 
groups of ‘the elderly’, ‘the sick and disabled’, ‘the unemployed’ and ‘migrants’ are the same (van 
Oorschot 2006). This suggests that deservingness opinions and attitudes are apparently deeply 
rooted in popular culture. van Oorschot (2006) speculates that this may be an example of a cultural 
pattern that finds its origin in its functionality for the survival of social groups. For instance, the 
deservingness criterion of identity may protect the group against burdensome support claims from 
outside the group, while the criterion of control may protect against such claims from inside the 
group. Petersen (2012) takes this issue further by arguing that determining the deservingness of 
individuals is a heuristic rooted in human psychology as it evolved during evolution.6 The idea is that 
in pre-historical, small-scaled societies we developed the skills to detect reciprocators who 
contribute to reciprocal food sharing, and cheaters who violated the rules of cooperation by taking 
advantage of the collective gains. Dealing with these reciprocators and cheaters is assumed to have 
structured cognitive categories and created judgmental shortcuts, called ‘deservingness heuristics’ 
                                                            
6
 See Fiske et al. (2006) for an alternative evolutionary perspective on stereotypical images of welfare 
recipients and the poor, which suggests that people judge groups on universal, evolutionary generated 
perceptions of warmth (trustworthiness) and competence (respect). In social surveys on the 
attribution of warmth and competence welfare recipients and poor in particular score low on both 
dimensions, which explains their negative public image. 
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(Petersen, 2012). Today we still apply these heuristics, which allows us to make more or less instant 
judgements about deservingness, also in relation to deservingness of social benefits. In these 
deservingness heuristics emotions play an important role. Petersen et al. (2012) found that both 
anger and compassion with the needy person are essential. Anger is important in social cooperation 
since it has the function to recalibrate cheaters to contribute in the future, while compassion easily 
allows to reward reciprocators. This was necessary in small-scaled societies that relied on a limited 
number of potential contributors (Petersen, 2012). What is essential for reciprocators is that others 
show an effort to contribute or have cooperative intentions, more than what people actual 
contribute. Therefore, perceptions of welfare recipients as being lazy and not putting in any or 
enough effort to provide for themselves, is strongly affecting their deservingness : it triggers the 
emotion of anger, and thus generates a more or less automatic and immediate perception of low 
deservingness. On the other hand, feelings of compassion with a needy person lead to an instant 
decision to support that individual (Petersen et al., 2012). Empirical experiments (Petersen et al. , 
2012) and social surveys (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014) show that Danes as well as Americans apply the 
deservingness heuristic as conceived by Petersen: people support allocating benefits to 
‘reciprocators’ and oppose benefits for ‘cheaters’ . (With the differences between the two 
populations being that Americans tend to perceive more cheaters in their society (‘lazy black 
people’), than Danes). The studies suggest that ‘reciprocity’ and ‘control’ are essential deservingness 
criteria: as long as welfare recipients show effort to improve their situation, or indicate that they 
want to cooperate or are not lazy in any sense, people are willing to include individuals in the 
redistribution system, but also a cooperative ‘attitude’ is important. Furthermore interesting is that 
Petersen (2012) shows that these psychological roots of deservingness heuristics operate 
independent of ideological stances of people (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993), of cultural differences 
(Gilens, 1999), or of institutional differences (Rothstein, 1998). That is, these perspectives believe 
that deservingness heuristics can be ‘learned’ in the sense that being exposed to a certain ideology, 
culture of institutional setting leads to the development of certain deservingness logics (Petersen, 
2012). Petersen (2012) suggest that deservingness heuristic are at the very heart of social 
cooperation and therefore essential in explaining the social legitimacy of our institutional 
arrangements, specifically redistributive benefit schemes. 
4 Suggestions for future research 
Research on the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits is at present mostly confined to 
analysis of public opinion surveys that contain relevant questions. There are, however, few of them, 
on national as well as a cross-national level, and often they only address a small number of target 
groups or deservingness criteria. This is a serious obstacle in developing the field further, 
theoretically as well as empirically. However, in the context of more or less permanent welfare 
reform in European welfare states, the interest in legitimacy questions is growing, which is why we 
aim in the remainder of this paper to contribute to further development of the field by discussing 
some suggestions for future research. We focus primarily on the deservingness perspective, since as 
we explained, there are arguments why deservingness is at the heart of the social legitimacy of 
differently targeted benefits.  
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4.1 Changing deservingness perceptions and welfare reform  
From the perspective that deservingness opinions play a central role in the formation of institutional 
features of social benefits, an interesting window opens regarding our understanding of the social 
legitimacy of welfare reform. That is, the perspective suggests that for such understanding we should 
look into changes in public perceptions of deservingness, and how these may lead to changes in the 
social legitimacy of existing welfare arrangements, and thus produce social pressure for reform, or 
how they strengthen the legitimacy of existing arrangements and create greater resilience against 
reform. With reference to figure 1, such changes can be twofold. Firstly, a target group’s ‘score’ on a 
specific deservingness criterion may change, leading to a change in the group’s overall degree of 
deservingness. An example would be if the general public starts seeing the elderly less as a needy 
category, when pensioners on average have become richer due to the maturation of pension systems 
in European countries and the general growth in wealth over the past decades. In this case, elderly 
would score less ‘positive’ on the criterion of need, with lower total deservingness as a consequence. 
Secondly, the relative importance or weight that people attach to specific deservingness criteria may 
change over time e.g. under the influence of social processes or contexts. For example, the criterion 
of control may gain more weight in overall deservingness in case liberal ideology gets more 
dominant. And finally, it is possible that these two changes happen at the same time. For example, if 
control becomes a more important deservingness criterion in a society and, for instance, the elderly 
are seen as more responsible for their income or care on an old age (‘they should have saved money 
when they could in the past’), the deservingness of the elderly for pensions or elderly home care 
might drop significantly. Unfortunately, at present there is a lack of data to study these kinds of 
relationships. 
However, as a reviewer of this paper rightly suggested, it may also be the case that deservingness 
opinions change in reaction to welfare reform. That is, if the ‘paradox of redistribution’ argument is 
right, one would expect that in countries where social spending in recent decades has increasingly 
been targeted at the poor and people with low incomes, the deservingness of recipients of benefits 
should have decreased. Again, at present we lack data for this kind of analysis. 
4.2 Contextual effects on the social legitimacy of targeted benefits 
In the literature there are different arguments why contextual factors would affect perceptions in 
deservingness of different target groups, yet studies that examine these effects directly are scarse. 
Most studies focus on the effects of economic downturn and rising unemployment on the 
deservingness of the unemployed or support for unemployment benefits. One argument is that 
economic downfall lowers the deservingness of the unemployed because people care for themselves 
first (Durr, 1993; Alt, 1979; Goul Andersen, 1992). But a contrary one says that economic downfall 
will strengthen support for the unemployed because then people feel that benefit claimants are less 
to blame for their situation (Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Hills, 2002; Jeene, et al. 2014; Bryson 1997). 
Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk (2014) find evidence for the latter, by examining Dutch longitudinal 
data. Other contextual effects that are examined are cultural, political and institutional factors. For 
instance, Rein (2001) shows for the US that cultural ideas of lone mothering changed the perceptions 
of the single mother from the deserving widow to the undeserving unmarried single parent or 
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'welfare queen'. Changes in political climate are suggested to change the ideas about personal 
responsibilities of welfare recipients as well (Jeene et al., 2014; Pettersen, 1995; Weaver et al., 1995). 
However, the influence of different contextual effects, including the effects of institutional (Albrekt 
Larsen, 2006) and policy changes (Jeene, et al. 2014), on the deservingness of different target groups 
should be examined in more detail and for more countries. Until now the literature shows evidence 
for Western countries only, while there is a rather strong Anglo-Saxon bias in this. The suggestion 
that deservingness perceptions have a universal character (Coughlin 1980) and seem to follow 
comparable orderings across European countries (van Oorschot, 2006) is therefore still open to 
empirical testing requiring data from non-Western countries. Studying longitudinal trends within 
countries could offer great insights in changes in social legitimacy of targeted benefits under the 
influence or pressure of changing social contexts. But with a few exceptions (e.g. Hills 2002, 2015; 
Jeene et al., 2013) this is difficult considering the lack of available data.  
4.3 Individual effects on the social legitimacy of targeted benefits 
Another interesting perspective for further research would be to distinguish among the 
deservingness perceptions of different groups of people. We know that individual characteristics as 
self-interest, ideology, religion, education, age, gender etc. are important in determining support for 
different welfare benefits and groups (see for instance: Meier Jaeger, 2006; d'Anjou et al., 1995; 
Svallfors, 1991; Svallfors, 1995), although effects are usually not very strong (Ploug, 1996; van 
Oorschot, 2002b), but studies about the influence of individual characteristics on the relative weight 
of different deservingness criteria are very limited (Jeene et al. 2013). One could imagine that people 
who relied on social benefits in the past weigh criteria differently because they find some criteria, for 
instance control, less important than other criteria. Or people with a higher education may think 
differently about the criterion of attitude than people with a lower education (Jeene et al. 2013). In 
addition to fluctuations in contextual effects, this can have consequences for the varying importance 
of different deservingness criteria as well. Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk (2013) were the first to 
explore this question empirically and examine with Dutch data which criteria matter more for which 
individuals. They find effects of socio-structural and cultural characteristics on the relative 
importance of the criteria of need, reciprocity and control for deservingness of disability pensions: 
Structural factors that are related to resource competition, like lower levels of education, lower 
income and unemployment, and cultural views like work ethic, are associated with stronger 
emphasis on the control and reciprocity deservingness criteria, while personal experience with the 
benefit lowers the emphasis. Other studies should examine whether these results can be generalized 
across time and countries, or examine differences across different benefit schemes. Also the 
theoretical underpinnings could be fleshed out and tested. 
4.4 The social legitimacy of differently targeted benefit obligations 
A new perspective on the social legitimacy of targeted benefits regards the duties that are attached 
to certain benefits. Policy makers place increased emphasis on activation, and ‘welfare to work’ 
measures, in which active job seeking and participating in training programs are increasingly 
demanded from benefit recipients (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001). Therefore, popular opinion on 
obligations related to activation or participation that could be attached to social assistance or 
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unemployment benefits are increasingly of interest. Deservingness theory can be used to explain 
why some groups are offered leniency on work obligations, and others are not. Studies in this field 
show that people generally approve of these responsibilities attached to entitlements, yet people 
differentiate in their approval or the strictness of the obligation between different target groups. 
Regarding unemployment benefits, people generally are less demanding in terms of job seek 
obligations in case of older unemployed and unemployed with dependent children, while being 
stricter for younger individuals (Houtman, 1997; Albrekt Larsen, 2008; Jeene and van Oorschot, 
2015). Jeene and van Oorschot (2015) further show that for social assistance and benefits targeted at 
the disabled, people are less strict for individuals who are more in need or who have more 
dependent children. Future research could extend this research to more countries, more target 
groups and more specifically test if there is a relation between the deservingness heuristics regarding 
benefit rights and obligations. 
4.5 Experimental methods in deservingness studies 
Research on the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits is at present mostly confined to 
analysis of public opinion surveys that contain relevant questions. There are few of them, on national 
as well as a cross-national level, they often only address a small number of target groups or 
deservingness criteria, and building up a broad body of knowledge is difficult because surveys often 
have different forms and formulations of deservingness items. These are serious obstacles in 
developing the field further. Recent publications however, apply various new data types and 
methods. Vignette studies confront respondents with detailed descriptions of situations of persons 
with certain characteristics and let them answer questions about the deservingness of these 
individuals (see for example: Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; Kootstra, 2014; Petersen, 2012). 
Slothuus (2007) uses fictive newspaper stories in experiments to test framing effects of deserving 
and undeserving poor and unemployed. The experiment revealed that framing welfare recipients as 
undeserving can be used by policymakers to convince citizens of welfare retrenchment policies. 
These new experimental studies are typically useful for assessing the relative weight of different 
criteria or the underlying deservingness heuristics of individuals. Extending research using this type 
of methods can therefore substantially contribute to our knowledge of social legitimacy of targeted 
benefits. 
4.6 Qualitative research 
Finally, whether survey or experiment, a problem in present day deservingness research is that 
deservingness criteria are pre-determined by researchers, deduced from existing literature and 
theories, and that their importance is assessed with quantitative techniques of data gathering and 
analysis. What is lacking thus far is qualitative research, e.g. in the form of in depth interviewing or 
forum groups, in which people are asked to freely discuss and reveal what kind of criteria they are 
inclined to apply to specific needy groups. 
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